Taken for a Ride: How Daimler-Benz Drove Off With Chrysler by Bill Vlasic , Bradley A. Stertz Search Amazon for other books by or about Bill Vlasic. Rating: Reviewed by: John L. Hoh, Jr.

Just a few short years ago, Chrysler Corporation was a high-flying outfit, making record profits, and designing showroom-stopping cars. It seemed nothing could go wrong.

Which made two announcements very surprising.

The first was the announcement by Kirk Kerkorian that he was launching an all-out offensive to buy out the shareholders of Chrysler and run the company privately. The dagger struck even deeper when it was announced former chairman Lee Iacocca was part of the Kerkorian effort. It doesn't come as a surprise that some confused Kerkorian with Kevorkian-they were sure this deal spelled the death of Chrysler. But the deal never consummated because of announcement number two.

Announcement number two was the "merger of equals" of Chrysler and Daimler-Benz to form DaimlerChrysler. As unlikely as the deal seemed, it left many wondering whether Chrysler's reputation would be enhanced because of the Daimler association or would Daimler's prestige sink with the Chrysler association? (I drive a Mercedes Dodge-class Neon coupe, in case you're wondering.)

It seemed like an ideal marriage. Daimler had the resources and the engineering expertise. Chrysler had a group of people that designed fun cars and had an extensive marketing arm and dealer network.

But something went wrong. In 2000, in the middle of a booming economy (actually, it would be the start of a nose-diving economy, thanks to Mr. Clinton), the cash cow that was Chrysler became a money pit. After making over a billion dollars in profits the year before, Chrysler lost half a billion in the third quarter of 2000 (Q3, 00 for you GE people).

What happened? Why did things go so sour so fast?

No doubt the company's resources were strained in fighting off Kerkorian's takeover bid. And the merger process is never easy on a company. (I often wonder, having "survived" two such mergers why a company sees any value in merging anyway.)

Or it could be that the Daimler strategy all along was to make Chrysler a divison under Daimler (Hmm, will the company name be changed?).

This book is thorough and exhaustive in research. It also isn't light reading. There are quotes galore from the movers and shakers in this saga. But it also seems to be coming from an American point of view. Did Schrempp not want to go "on the record" for this book?

To be sure, cultural differences are glaringly exposed. The Germans wanted recalls mentioned by division (Dodge, Plymouth, Jeep, Chrysler) rather than by the company (DaimlerChrysler). The Germans would go ballistic when a lawsuit was filed against the company-the Germans wanted the Chrysler brass to stop a press release they had no control over! The Germans were not used to selling to the mass American market and its rebates and incentives.

Sounds to me like due diligence wasn't done on both sides.

And Kerkorian? He ended up frustrated with a smaller percentage of the pie. He went from largest shareholder in Chrysler to third largest in DaimlerChrysler (Deutsche Bank and Kuwaiti oil barons held more equity than Kerkorian). As the stock value plummeted, Kerkorian grew angrier. When Schrempp in a British interview revealed his true intention, to make Chrysler a division of Daimler, Kerkorian filed suit. Suddenly Schrempp wanted to meet privately with Kerkorian, after ignoring him since the "merger."

What will happen in Chrysler's future, or the future of DaimlerChrysler? Hard to tell, although the authors mention several scenarios. In my paperback edition an epilogue was added. But in the wake of September 11, 2000, what happens may be anyone's guess.